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Abstract—Sharing, comparing and negotiating security-
related actions and requirements across businesses has always
been a complicated matter. Issues arise due to semantic
gaps, disparity in security documentation and formats, and
incomplete security-related information during negotiations,
to say the least. As collaborations amongst e-businesses in
particular increase, there is a growing, implicit need to address
these issues and ease companies’ deliberations on security. Our
research has investigated this topic in substantial detail, and
in this paper we present a novel solution model and tool for
supporting businesses through these tasks. Initial evaluation
results and feedback from interviewed security professionals
affirm the use and suitability of our proposals in supporting
the security actions negotiation process.
Keywords-Security negotiations; business-oriented frame-
work; e-business collaborations; security ontology; XML se-
curity language; support tool
I. INTRODUCTION
Inter-organizational e-business, endorsed by a wide suite
of enabling technologies (e.g., Web services, ebXML, Roset-
taNet), is now one of the most promising and lucrative
business paradigms. To sustain these online interactions,
security researchers and professionals have investigated nu-
merous technologies, processes and best practices. In previ-
ous work we have also contributed to this area by defining
the Business-Oriented Framework for enhancing Web Ser-
vices Security for e-business (BOF4WSS) [1]. BOF4WSS’
uniqueness stems from its emphasis on a detailed cross-
enterprise development methodology, to aid collaborating e-
businesses in jointly creating secure and trusted interactions.
This particularly refers to the creation of a multilayered se-
curity solution, which encompasses technologies, processes,
policies and strategies, and spans the interacting companies.
Further to the comprehensive guidance supplied by
BOF4WSS, our research has explored the provision of
a range of useful support systems. These would assist
in the framework’s application to business scenarios, and
seek to streamline various essential, but often arduous or
problematic development tasks (e.g., see Section II). The
presentation and evaluation of one of these novel support
systems and its underlying conceptual solution model, form
the primary contributions of this paper.
The specific problem area of interest in this work, con-
cerns the difficulties in negotiating security actions and
requirements across companies; a prerequisite activity before
the joint systems are developed. Here, a security action is
defined as any high-level way in which a company handles
a risk it faces (e.g., ‘the risk of ensuring the security of a
server is to be outsourced’), whereas a security requirement
is a high-to-medium level desire, expressed to mitigate a risk
(e.g., ‘the integrity of personal data must be maintained’).
Security actions thus encompassing security requirements.
The problem area highlighted above, relates to the hard-
ships incurred when transitioning from the individually
completed Requirements Elicitation stage, to the subse-
quent Negotiations stage in BOF4WSS, where companies
meet to present, negotiate and reconcile their security ac-
tions/requirements. As shown in forthcoming sections, prob-
lems faced include (i) understanding other companies’ secu-
rity documentation, (ii) understanding the motivation behind
security actions/requirements, (iii) being able to easily match
and compare security actions from businesses which target
the same situation, and (iv) gathering and assimilating rel-
evant aspects motivating security actions when reconciling
security to apply to the foreseen business scenario.
Having assessed the difficulties of stage transition, the
next aim is to present the novel Solution Model, which
forms the conceptual foundation for the support system tool
to address these complications. The implemented software
tool is also introduced. With the system presented, we then
report on the evaluation to date, including highlighting the
benefits and shortcomings of the tool and underlying model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II examines
the difficulties faced as businesses using BOF4WSS move
between the stages mentioned above. With that context set,
Section III outlines the Solution Model. Next, Section IV
gives an overview of a prototype system actually developed.
This is followed by a discourse on the evaluation and its
findings in Section V, before presenting the related work in
Section VI. Conclusions are presented in Section VII.
II. THE STAGE TRANSITION PROBLEM
Sharing, comparing and negotiating on security actions
and requirements across companies, even at a high-level,
has always been a complex matter. Tiller’s work ([2]) gives
insight into this issue as he labels the related process,
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“security mayhem”, because of the variety of security as-
pects (e.g., specific polices, service-level agreements, legal
obligations, unique access requirements) to be considered in
forming business collaborations. The reality of this problem
is underlined by Dynes et al. [3] who set out a research
agenda with a core question being: how can a shared vision
on risks and security for interacting companies be achieved
which appreciates their range of differences?
To investigate the specific issues surrounding stage transi-
tion and the negotiation of security actions as they pertain to
BOF4WSS, a case scenario was used. This scenario featured
companies using the framework during the Requirements
Elicitation and Negotiations stages, and especially focused
on how security actions were determined, how these actions
were documented/expressed, and how parties compared and
negotiated on them. To strengthen the practicality of the
scenario, security professionals knowledgeable in external
company interactions were interviewed and their input used
to guide case development. After defining the case scenario,
it was analyzed to identify areas which proved difficult,
problematic, or overly tedious for companies. Some of the
most prominent areas are discussed below.
• Understanding the security actions documents of the
other companies “as is”: In the Negotiations phase,
companies supply their security actions to their business
partners for perusal and discussion. A major difficulty
even at this early stage was gaining an appreciation of
what exactly companies meant (i.e., a semantic issue)
when they outlined a security action or requirement in
a few brief, informal statements, often with little justifi-
cation. Included in this, is the reality that companies may
use different terminologies for security actions, associated
risks, threats, and vulnerabilities. These problems were
further compounded by the variety of techniques (e.g.,
requirement listings, generic checklists, graphical repre-
sentations) used by businesses to document their security
actions. The core issues at this point therefore link to the
semantic gap likely to be prevalent across companies, and
the disparity in formats used to document actions. Both of
these aspects resulted in the need for companies to spend
considerable time and effort understanding actions and
requirements before any negotiations could take place.
• Understanding the motivation behind other compa-
nies’ security actions and requirements: From the sum-
mary documentation which constituted companies’ secu-
rity actions and requirements, it was often somewhat chal-
lenging for other businesses to determine exactly why that
security desire existed. Even if the security situation/risk
which the security action intended to address was included
in the description, there might have been a plethora of
other aspects (e.g., laws and regulations, security policies)
considered in the preceding risk assessment that were
not specified in the action description. These aspects
are important because they provide insight into security
actions that form the basis for companies negotiations. As
a result of this incomplete information, companies usually
had to enter further discussions to determine these aspects
before making decisions on individual security actions.
• Comparison of companies’ security actions and re-
quirements: This task entailed parsing through other
companies’ actions and requirements documents to note
and question any existing conflicts across businesses.
Included in this task was the implicit or explicit matching
of security actions from companies which targeted the
same situation or risk. Even in the cases where security
actions were classified into groups beforehand, the task
of parsing through documents, and the various back-and-
forth communications necessary to match and compare
actions even at a basic level, resulted in the consumption
of a vast amount of man-hours. An additional issue at this
point was ensuring that all aspects motivating security ac-
tions (e.g., laws, security policies, contractual obligations)
were gathered, documented and readily available for con-
sideration, to support actual comparison and negotiations.
Any streamlining of the aforementioned processes would
save time, money, and effort for parties.
Having presented some of the core problems discovered
from the case analysis, Section III outlines the conceptual
Solution Model for the system to support stage transition.
III. SOLUTION MODEL
The Solution Model, shown in Figure 1, contains four
components: Security Actions Analysis, Ontology Design,
Language Definition and Risk Catalogue Creation. The
prime aim of this model is to outline a notional base on
which a tool that would actually support the negotiation of
security actions across companies, could be implemented. A
description of the components is given below.




Language DefinitionRisk Catalogue Creation
(provides listing of risks, which are
 later used as base for comparison)
(formally specifies security actions
& factors motivating them, inclu-
sive of risks, laws, policies, etc.)
informed
creation of..
Figure 1. Solution Model
Security Actions Analysis: As a first step to addressing
the problems related to the semantic gap and the disparity in
formats used to document actions (identified in Section II),
an in-depth analysis of the security actions and requirements
domain was required. This assessment focused on security
literature particularly in the security risk management field
(as this area was viewed as key to determining security
actions), and critically examined how security actions and
requirements were derived. From that analysis, common
critical factors, especially those that constituted and moti-
vated their derivation were then identified. This component
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stage’s findings allowed for a thorough understanding of that
domain, and furnished the foundation for following stages.
Ontology Design: Ontologies are widely known for their
ability to specify a shared understanding about a particular
domain. In this case, an ontology was used to provide a
common understanding of the security actions (and gener-
ally, security risk management) domain, based on findings
from the Security Actions Analysis stage. Establishing this
common semantic bridge was a critical prerequisite in cre-
ating the overall solution, when considering how different
the terminologies, methods, and influential factors internal
to each business were likely to be. It was also critical
that the ontology was encompassing, and therefore allowed
for an easy semantic mapping of concepts onto it from
typical security action determination (or simply, security risk
management) methods used by companies. Readers should
note that the ontology designed here is high-level and mainly
diagrammatic (i.e., there is no formal ontology language). As
such, it is more of a communications tool, which can also
be built on in future components. An ontology draft, and the
Analysis component were previously presented in [4].
Language Definition: Two of the core issues identified
in Section II center around the numerous formats used for
security actions, and the incomplete information initially
presented regarding the motivation for those actions. The
Language Definition stage addressed these issues by defining
a formal language to be used by companies at the end of
Requirements Elicitation. The benefit of a formal language
as opposed to a shared text-based template, or graphical
representation is the automation it would allow; encoded
data could now be processed by a machine. This language
would enable the formal expression of parties’ security
actions, and the factors that motivated them (e.g., risks, laws,
security policies and so on) in a common format. By having
these motivational factors initially included and specified,
this negates the need to enter lengthy discussions to de-
termine these aspects later. An XML-based language was
preferred to facilitate encoding due to its wide acceptance,
XML’s platform independence, and the variety of systems
support options (numerous APIs for parsing and validation)
available. To define the language’s syntax, the ontology was
an invaluable asset. Aiding in language definition was one
of the original purposes of the ontology, as its use ensured
that the language was grounded in accepted literature and
supported by some common semantics across companies.
Risk Catalogue Creation: To address the problem of
matching and comparing security actions across enterprises,
emphasis was placed on identifying an aspect which was
common to the actions and could be held constant. There-
fore, regardless of the divergent security actions for a
situation defined by businesses, a common underlying aspect
could be used to quickly (or automatically) match these
actions. After reviewing the Security Actions Analysis, it
was apparent that in a majority of cases, security actions
were established to handle or treat some inherent risk. The
range of security action determination methods used by
companies enforced this reality (see work in [4]). To provide
the constant base therefore, a shared risks listing/catalogue
was instituted and developed. This catalogue contained an
updatable, extensive listing of security risks, and was used
by companies as a common input to their risk management
processes (i.e. the process that identifies, analyzes, evaluates,
and decides treatment for the risks). Although businesses
used different processes and derived possibly disparate se-
curity actions, they maintained a common base in terms
of what risks were addressed by a particular action. Once
implemented in a system, this common base would allow for
the automated matching of security actions from companies,
and thus ease the task of matching and comparing actions.
A general idea of how the implemented Solution Model
worked towards significantly easing stage transition, is illus-
trated in Figure 2. In this diagram Supplier and Buyer
are using BOF4WSS for an online business scenario.
risks (assets,
threats, vulnerabilities)
all security actions & factors
motivating them, inclusive
of risks, laws, policies,  etc.
Suppliers encoded
security actions & factors
motivating them
(i)  User-friendly interface where security actions and the related
     security risks, are automatically matched and displayed
(ii) Inconsistencies flagged that represent exceptional situations












exchanged Buyers risk mana-
gement methodology
Comparison system
































Data entry & data
storage system
Data entry & data
storage system
security data entered/stored ...
Figure 2. Solution Model in action
A briefly outline is now given on the conceptually im-
plemented model in Figure 2. To begin, risks from the
risk catalogue are selected by companies to form input
to each entity’s risk management methodology (i.e., pro-
cess to determine security actions and requirements). Once
companies determine their individual security actions, these
actions and the factors motivating them are transferred into
an Encoding system and marked up into the XML-based
language defined. When businesses meet in BOF4WSS’
Negotiations stage, the encoded documents are then passed
to a Comparison system that matches companies’ security
actions based on the underlying risks they address. Currently,
the output of the Comparison system focuses on (i) a
user-friendly interface where security actions (supported by
related risks, and motivational factors) are automatically
matched and displayed, and (ii) flagging of any inconsis-
tencies identified for follow-up by personnel. A noteworthy
point is that the Solution Model and resulting tool are
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especially geared towards shared risks faced by entities.
Therefore in some regards, emphasis is placed on the shared
risks where companies have to agree on how they will be
treated i.e., the type of security action (e.g., mitigation,
transference, acceptance, avoidance), and actual action to
apply. Section IV formally introduces the tool which em-
bodies the Encoding and Comparison systems above. This is




The SASaCS tool represents the culmination of this work,
in that, it is the software implementation of the Solution
Model. SASaCS consists of all the practical components
necessary to support the presentation, sharing, comparison
and negotiation of security actions across companies. As
a result of its tight coupling with the Solution Model, the
general process outlined at the end of Section III applies to
the tool as well. In Section IV therefore, we provide more
detail on the tool by discussing two of its features, the Data
Entry interface and the Encoding system. These aspects were
chosen because they allow novel parts of SASaCS to be
highlighted, and set the platform for evaluation in Section V.
Once companies have conducted their risk management
activities (which are informed initially to some degree, by
the shared risk catalogue) and produced their individual
security actions, the next task is transferring them into (their
locally installed copy of) the SASaCS tool. This is handled
by the Data entry and storage system. This system, shown
in Figure 2, provides a set of simple, intuitive screens
for users to input their security related data (e.g., risks,
security actions and factors motivating them) and have it
stored to a back-end tool database. To ease usability, the
tool also allows the direct referencing and selection of
risks from the risk catalogue, that initially factored into the
company’s risk management activities. Therefore, users can
look-up risks from the catalogue, apply them to the current
project/collaboration, and then annotate them, or otherwise
use them as they see fit (e.g., input‘ risk priority levels,
associate them with a security action, and so on).
As SASaCS is based on the ontology designed, its data
entry screens benefit from the unambiguous definition of
concepts (such as risk, risk level, and so on) prevalent with
the ontology. The ontology diagram itself and its docu-
mentation also are useful in assisting users understanding
of concepts, and linking data entry fields to output from
their risk management methodologies. In addition to having
data fields mirroring the basic concepts from the ontology,
the Data entry interface defines a number of other fields to
allow companies to add more detail on relevant aspects such
as company-specific risk descriptions, justifications of risk
levels, annotations regarding treatments of risks, treatment
coverage levels, and security requirements. Figure 3 shows
a screenshot of the security action (or in other terms, risk
treatment action) data entry screen in SASaCS.
Figure 3. Security action data entry screenshot
After each enterprise has saved their security- and risk-
related data to the tool, the following step is encoding
that data in preparation for inter-company negotiations. The
Encoding system (also installed locally) facilitates this by
pulling data from the tool database, marking it up in the
XML-based language discussed previously, and outputting
a document with the encoded data. When companies meet
for negotiations therefore, (i) they use the same format to ex-
press security actions/requirements, which is also machine-
processable; (ii) there is a shared understanding of the
security- and risk-related concepts, promoted by the com-
mon ontology and highly supportive tool data entry screens;
(iii) information is more complete as factors motivating
security actions should initially have been supplied; and (iv)
because encoded data (particularly security actions) includes
references to risks in the risk catalogue, there are commonal-
ities across companies’ documents. The Comparison system
uses these commonalities to automatically match security
actions/requirements that treat the same shared risks.
As an example of (iv) above, let us assume three com-
panies, A, B, and C. According to information provided in
their XML-based documents, we see that A defines a security
action to address a risk related to the confidentiality of
information (hereafter, RiskX). In B’s document, they also
have a security action stated to handle that risk. C however,
has decided not to consider or address RiskX , and therefore
it is not included in their document. By having all this
information supplied in the XML-based documents at the
time companies meet for negotiations, SASaCS can be used
to assist in a number of important tasks. One such task is
automatically matching the disparate security actions of A
and B based on their mutual goal towards handling RiskX .
Another feature is its ability to instantly discover that C is
not addressing the shared risk. This could then be flagged
for follow-up by personnel. Streamlining these, at times
simple tasks, can significantly reduce the time and effort
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needed by companies during the initial stages of BOF4WSS
negotiations. In the next section, we examine the encoding
aspect more by presenting the XML-based language defined.
For ease of reference, this language is called SADML, or
Security Actions Definition Markup Language.
B. The Language
The structure of SADML was conceived to mirror the
knowledge captured in the ontology (largely defined in [4]).
As such, various ontology’s concepts are represented as
XML elements/tags. To comply with XML’s hierarchical
nature, it was necessary to define a sensible hierarchy of
elements. Furthermore, this structure would need to accom-
modate one-to-many relationships across elements (for ex-
ample, if a law motivates/supports multiple security actions,
this should be appreciated). Considering these and a few
other aspects, SADML’s syntax was defined. A snippet of the
SADML format representing the information in Figure 3 is
presented below; the + sign indicates additional data which
is not displayed here. The core language is described in the
schema, indicated by urn:risksx-schema in the snippet.
<needsBase xmlns="urn:risksx-schema" ... >
<mitigationActions>
<mitigationAction>




<relationToRiskAction>SOX Act was key to this miti-






<transferenceActions /> <!-- No actions defined -->





As can be seen above, needsBase is the root element
and its sub-elements encompass the four general types of
security action, and the main factors identified which moti-
vate them. In practice, SADML groups risks by the type of
security action (e.g., mitigation, or <mitigationActions>)
which addresses them, and then the exact written action
(e.g., <mitigationAction>) defined by a company. Because
one security action can address many risks, each action
has a <risks> element that lists the risks addressed. The
elements suffixed with ‘Refs’ are used to indicate that
existing motivational factors, for example laws and regu-
lations (<lawsAndRegs>), influenced the treatment of a risk.
<securityRequirementRefs> is the exception, in that it ref-
erences security requirements (<securityRequirements>)
that detail security actions. SADML’s structure proposes one
way to define security actions, risks and motivational factors,
and does not intend to be a panacea in itself.
The novelty of SADML is rooted in the unique business
perspective it takes on risks and security actions, which
aims to (i) maintain a strong practical foundation (by
mirroring the ontology designed) and (ii) place security,
at least initially, at a level that understandable to security
professionals and business-based decision makers (often the
budget holders) alike. Section V which follows, reports on
the findings of the evaluation on the Solution Model and
SASaCS tool, to date.
V. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS
The evaluation of this research’s proposals was based
around assessing the suitability and use of SASaCS (in-
clusive of the Solution Model’s components) in supporting,
and even streamlining the overall negotiations process in
BOF4WSS. This paper focuses only on one of the initial
evaluation stages which investigated the compatibility of
SASaCS and the ontology in particular, with existing risk
management/assessment approaches. Compatibility formed
a critical requirement because information (e.g., security
actions, risks) from these approaches, irregardless of how
different they are, or what output they generate, should be
accommodated in the tool (and by extension the ontology
which drives it). If the tool was able to capture a majority of
the output (even if this involved a mapping of semantically
similar concepts), this would support the completeness of
the ontology which underlies the tool, and give evidence to
show that SASaCS can adequately fit in, and work alongside
current approaches used in companies today.
To evaluate compatibility, two well-known risk man-
agement approaches were chosen, i.e., CORAS [5] and
EBIOS [6]. The softwares that support these methods made
it easier to identify the exact output that companies would
produce, which would then need to be accommodated by
the tool/ontology. To add structure to this evaluation, the
method for mapping security guidelines to an existing model
(both high-, and low-level) in [7] was employed. Through the
completion of its steps, a detailed assessment was carried out
to determine how well the tool/ontology mapped, and thus
were compatible with existing risk management/assessment
approaches. Having outlined our focus, the following para-
graphs present key findings of the completed evaluation.
In general, SASaCS proved itself a compatible solution
as it was successfully able to capture a majority of the
information output from CORAS and EBIOS. Coverage
was especially good for the core concepts such as risks,
security actions, risk treatments and security requirements.
This mapping was so promising that a semi-automated
transference of output from those risk management softwares
into SASaCS, is being pursued.
A shortcoming in the ontology discovered from EBIOS
output mapping was as a result of the link maintained
between security actions (i.e., risk actions in [4]) and risks.
In the ontology and therefore in SASaCS, based on the
investigation then, it was concluded that security actions
primarily originated to handle, or treat risks. This conclusion
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however was disproved by EBIOS as a security action could
be created to directly address constraints (e.g., operational,
financial), regulations, or security rules and policies.
Lastly, in the ontology and tool, laws and regulations,
security and business policies, and security budgets were de-
fined as the prime factors which motivated a risk’s treatment.
Findings during the mapping evaluation however, showed
that there were various other aspects which influenced and
by themselves lead to the creation of security actions. A
good example is the constraints of a operational, technical,
budgetary and even territorial nature, faced. To enhance
the ontology and tool, the shortcomings identified in this
and previous paragraphs will need to be addressed. This is
discussed more in future work; next we cover related work.
VI. RELATED WORK
In [8], authors assessed similar disparity problems to
the Solution Model, particularly in communicating security
requirements. They proposed a framework for formally
specifying requirements and detecting conflicts amongst col-
laborating parties. The core difference between that research
and our work is in the layers targeted; the Solution Model
supports high-level security negotiations for businesses,
whereas [8] considers low-level security requirements (and
by extension, only risk mitigation), and formal rules and
algorithms for requirements refinement.
Apart from the related literature on the ontology pre-
viously presented in [4], the only other area with similar
work is the XML-based language defined. In research and
industry there have been a plethora of security languages
covering from access control (e.g., XACML), to identity
management (e.g., SAML). The most relevant to our work
is the Enterprise Security Requirement Markup Language
(ESRML) [9]. This language is comparable to SADML
because it emphasizes the higher layers of security, and the
sharing and exchanging the enterprise security information
across companies for business purposes. The shortcomings
of ESRML in terms of this work however are its lack
of emphasis on factors which significantly influence or
drive security actions (e.g., regulations, constraints), and its
concentration on risk mitigation as opposed to explicitly
appreciating other ways to treat risks.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we present a novel solution model and tool to
support the negotiation of security actions in e-business col-
laborations. Although developed to accompany BOF4WSS,
these proposals are likely to have further applications in sup-
porting one-off, cross-enterprise business-based interactions,
or even internal company negotiations. Having outlined the
model and tool, we then briefly reported on one stage of
the evaluation process which assessed ontology and tool
compatibility with existing risk management processes.
Beyond addressing the shortcomings discovered in the
compatibility evaluation, the next steps in our research
involve the continued assessment of the Solution Model and
tool. Currently, we are concluding an evaluation of the tool,
which involved interviews with industry-based security pro-
fessionals familiar with cross-enterprise security negotiation
issues. Next, we will make any necessary changes based on
feedback, and then test the tool in a real-world scenario to
ultimately evaluate its suitability in supporting the security
actions negotiation process.
REFERENCES
[1] J. R. Nurse and J. E. Sinclair, “BOF4WSS: A Business-
Oriented Framework for Enhancing Web Services Security
for e-Business,” in 4th International Conference on Internet
and Web Applications and Services (ICIW). IEEE Computer
Society, 2009, pp. 286–291.
[2] J. S. Tiller, The Ethical Hack: A Framework for Business Value
Penetration Testing. Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach Publ., 2005.
[3] S. Dynes, L. M. Kolbe, and R. Schierholz, “Information
security in the extended enterprise: A research agenda,” in
AMCIS 2007 Proceedings, 2007.
[4] J. R. Nurse and J. E. Sinclair, “Supporting the compar-
ison of business-level security requirements within cross-
enterprise service development,” in Business Information Sys-
tems, ser. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing,
W. Abramowicz, Ed. Heidelberg: Springer, 2009, vol. 21, pp.
61–72.
[5] F. den Braber, G. Brændeland, H. E. I. Dahl, I. Engan, I. Hog-
ganvik, M. S. Lund, B. Solhaug, K. Stølen, and F. Vraalsen,
“The CORAS model-based method for security risk analysis,”
SINTEF, Tech. Rep., 2006.
[6] DCSSI, “Expression des besoins et identification des objectifs
de se´curite´ (EBIOS) – section 1–5,” Secre´tariat ge´ne´ral de
la de´fense nationale, Direction Centrale de la Se´ccurite´c des
Syste`cmes D’Information (DCSSI), Tech. Rep., 2004.
[7] S. Fenz, T. Pruckner, and A. Manutscheri, “Ontological map-
ping of information security best-practice guidelines,” in Busi-
ness Information Systems, ser. Lecture Notes in Business
Information Processing, W. Abramowicz, Ed. Heidelberg:
Springer, 2009, vol. 21, pp. 49–60.
[8] S. S. Yau and Z. Chen, “A framework for specifying and
managing security requirements in collaborative systems,” in
Autonomic and Trusted Computing, ser. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, L. T. Yang, H. Jin, J. Ma, and T. Ungerer,
Eds. Heidelberg: Springer, 2006, vol. 4158, pp. 500–510.
[9] J. Roy, M. Barik, and C. Mazumdar, “ESRML: a markup
language for enterprise security requirement specification,” in
IEEE INDICON, Kharagpur, 2004, pp. 509–512.
18
